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Abstract
We present a model of Cournot rivalry where domestic and foreign firms compete in a third-
country market, and where the domestic export subsidy is determined by lobbying.  Greater
domestic cost heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the marginal costs of the domestic
firms) means that the subsidy level, aggregate domestic output, and domestic market share will all
be higher.  However, the effect of heterogeneity on domestic welfare is ambiguous.  From a near-
symmetric initial situation, greater domestic cost-heterogeneity reduces domestic welfare if the
number of domestic firms exceeds some critical value.  However, when starting farther from
symmetry, greater heterogeneity may raise welfare.  Our results are in contrast with the no-
lobbying scenario, where market share is independent of increased heterogeneity, and welfare is
monotonically increasing in it.   
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Federal Reserve System.
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1. Introduction
While the area of trade policy with oligopolistic industries has been widely researched, the
role of lobbying in determining policy in such a setting has received relatively little attention.  It is
well understood, though, that actual trade policy has more to do with political economy
considerations than with the welfare-enhancing rent-shifting motive normally discussed in the
literature.  In this regard, the literature is lagging behind other the areas of trade theory, where
various trade policies have been modeled as the results of political processes, rather than of
government maximization of national welfare.
 1 The need to close this gap is apparent from
Olsonian arguments (Olson, 1965), which would suggest that lobbying should be more prevalent
in oligopolistic industries than in more-competitive ones.  In such a setting, the gains from
lobbying are concentrated in the hands of an especially small group, oligopolists, whereas the
losses are borne by an especially large and dispersed group, taxpayers.
The question we consider is the welfare effects of lobbying when domestic firms compete
with foreign firms in a third market.  We augment the standard Brander and Spencer (1985) setup
by allowing the subsidy to increase with domestic-firm lobbying.  This follows Moore and
Suranovic (1993), who find that the standard case for strategic export subsidies is weakened when
rent-seeking costs are considered.  The novelty of our model is that domestic firms have
heterogeneous marginal costs, allowing us to examine the effect of this cost heterogeneity on the
firms’ lobbying efforts, and, hence, on the subsidy and welfare.  Another model in which trade
policy for oligopolies depends on lobbying efforts is Long and Soubeyran (1996).  They analyze
the relationship between cost heterogeneity and import tariffs when tariffs are determined by2Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) have an analogous outcome, although their context is quite
different.
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domestic-firm lobbying.  They find that under certain conditions, an increase in the degree of
heterogeneity raises the tariff level when lobbying is non-cooperative.  In the cooperative case, the
relationship between the tariff level and cost heterogeneity depends on the elasticity of the slope
of the demand curve. 
  The first link between domestic cost heterogeneity and welfare in a third-country export
rivalry model is its effects on domestic output and profits.  Bergstrom and Varian (1985, p. 715)
show that industry output in a constant marginal cost Cournot oligopoly is independent of the
distribution of the marginal costs.  This implies that in an international oligopoly, a mean-
preserving spread of domestic marginal costs will not affect domestic or foreign aggregate output. 
Nonetheless, as Long and Soubeyran (1997) demonstrate, average domestic profit is increasing in
the degree of domestic cost heterogeneity, even though domestic market share is unaffected. 
This, in turn, means that domestic welfare rises with cost heterogeneity because of improved
allocative efficiency in producing the unchanged aggregate domestic output level (recall
Bergstrom and Varian, 1985).  This effect holds regardless of the number of domestic firms.
The second link between welfare and domestic cost heterogeneity is through domestic
lobbying efforts.  When lobbying is noncooperative, and the subsidy level is determined by total
lobbying expenditure, the domestic export subsidy is a public good for the domestic firms. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, only the lowest-cost domestic firm will expend lobbying effort.
2  If
there are only two domestic firms, greater cost heterogeneity means more lobbying because less
of the profit shifted from the foreign firm goes to the high-cost non-contributing firm, i.e. there is
less free riding.  With more than two domestic firms, it depends on whether the greater cost3This result is transparent under linear demand.  The profit shifting effect (due to a net
increase in domestic output) is exactly offset by the negative effect on domestic profits due to a
price reduction.  The only effects that remain are the increased subsidy payments (on incremental
output) and rent-seeking costs. 
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heterogeneity affects costs for the dominant, lowest-cost, firm.  If it does not, then the output and
lobbying efforts of the dominant firm are unrelated to the degree of cost heterogeneity.  On the
other hand, similar to the two-domestic-firm case, a mean-preserving increase in cost
heterogeneity that lowers the marginal cost of the dominant firm will lead to a higher subsidy.  
The overall welfare effects of higher cost heterogeneity depend on the balance of the
potential gains (allocative efficiency and the shift of profit from the foreign firm) and the potential
costs (the government’s subsidy outlays and the firms’ rent-seeking costs).  We find that when
there are only two domestic firms, greater cost heterogeneity is welfare-reducing when starting
from near-symmetry.  Because the firms have very similar costs, for given output levels the effect
of the cost dispersion is effectively zero.  What tips the balance is that the positive profit-shifting
effect is more than offset by the costs of the resulting expansion of the subsidy.
3  However, at the
other extreme of near-monopoly, when the domestic firms have very different costs, the welfare
gains from profit-shifting and allocative efficiency may dominate.  Thus, with two domestic firms,
the relationship between cost heterogeneity is (in general) non-monotonic.
The relationship between welfare and cost heterogeneity is more complicated when there
are multiple domestic and foreign firms.  First, domestic cost heterogeneity may increase without
affecting the costs of the dominant domestic firm.  If so, then the domestic subsidy and market
share are unaffected, and welfare rises because of improved allocative efficiency.  On the other
hand, if a mean-preserving spread involves a cost reduction for the dominant firm, the effect of
greater cost heterogeneity on welfare is ambiguous.  If the number of domestic firms is sufficiently4Section-3 of the paper extends the analysis to the multi-firm case where there are n
domestic and m foreign firms.  The important findings of the current section are generally
supported, although some interesting new possibilities arise in the multi-firm case.
5Throughout the paper we assume that foreign marginal costs are constant.  Thus, when
we have a domestic mean-preserving spread, it also implies that the sum of all (domestic and
foreign) marginal costs is constant.
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large, welfare falls starting from a near-symmetric situation because there is little profit to be
shifted from the relatively few foreign firms.  Also, from near-symmetry, the allocative efficiency
effects are small, so there is a greater likelihood of a negative welfare effect from the adverse
effects of rent-seeking.  Conversely, starting from a high level of heterogeneity and a relatively
large number of foreign firms, welfare is likely to rise in response to a mean-preserving spread. 
2.  The Model and Analysis
First consider the effects of domestic cost heterogeneity in the absence of lobbying. 
Suppose there are two domestic firms, 1 and 2, and a foreign firm, 3, competing in a third-country
market.
4  Let the firms produce outputs qi at constant marginal costs ci.  Inverse demand is:
p = p(Q), Q = q1 + q2 + q3. (1)





 = (p - ci )qi , i=1,2,3.  (2)
The firms’ first order conditions are:
p - ci + qipN= 0.  (3) 
As Bergstrom and Varian (1985) point out: (i). adding these first order conditions implies that Q
is a function of the sum of all marginal costs; and, (ii) dqi = (1/pN)dci, where the sum of all
marginal costs is constant.
5  This implies that:
d(q1 + q2) = (1/pN)d(c1 + c2).  (3N)
Thus, aggregate domestic output (and market share) is a function only of aggregate domestic6We will make the standard assumption that for all firms marginal revenue diminishes in
another firm’s output level.  That is: pN+qipO<0.
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costs, and is independent of domestic cost heterogeneity.  
Domestic welfare W is the sum of the profits of the domestic firms, and, following Long
and Soubeyran (1997, page-210), it is clear that W is an increasing function of domestic cost
heterogeneity (given a constant mean of domestic costs).  We show below that if subsidies are
determined endogenously, then the effects of an increase in cost heterogeneity on market share
and welfare can be strikingly different from this.  
    We introduce lobbying into the model with a modified version of the Moore and Suranovic
(1993) model.  Let Li be the lobbying effort of firm i, w be the exogenously given price of
lobbying effort, and F be the level of subsidy in the home country.  The foreign nation is assumed
to be committed to free trade.  The lobbying effort and output levels are chosen simultaneously. 
The subsidy level is a function of the total amount of lobbying effort by the domestic firms:
F = F(L1+L2), FN>0, FO<0.  (4)
The profits of the firms when there are domestic lobbying opportunities are:
B
i
 = {p - ci + F(.)}qi - wLi, i=1,2.  (5)
B
3
 = (p-c3)q3.  (6)
2.1 Non-Cooperative Lobbying
The first order condition of the foreign firm’s profit maximization yields:
6
p-c3 + q3pN = 0 Y q3 = q3(q1+q2, c3), Mq3/M(q1+q2)= q3. = -(pN+q3pO)/(2pN+q3pO)<0. (7)
The first order conditions of the domestic firms are:
p - ci + F + qipN = 0, i=1,2.  (8)
qiFN- w #0, i=1,2.  (9)6
Using (8) and taking the difference of the first order conditions of the two domestic firms, it is
easy to see that q1 exceeds q2 if 1 is the low-cost firm.  If q1FN equals w, then q2FN must be less
than w, meaning that (9) is binding only for the low-cost firm.  Therefore, in equilibrium, firm-2,
the high-cost firm, will not lobby at all.  This outcome is similar to a Panagariya-Rodrik (1993)
type free riding equilibrium, where a uniform tariff generates free riding by industries which have
lower marginal benefit from protection compared to the industry that lobbies in equilibrium.  The
similarity between our context and theirs is in the public good aspect of the subsidy, which arises
because the subsidy is common to all domestic firms in the industry.  
Using (9) and suppressing w:
q1FN(L1) = w Y L1 = L1(q1), L1q = -FN/(q1FO) > 0. (10)
(7), (8) and (10) are four equations in the three output levels and the level of the lobbying effort
L1. The solution to this system yields the endogenous variables as functions of the marginal costs
and w.  We will suppress w and c3 in the rest of the analysis, and focus on the effects of a mean-
preserving spread of c1 and c2 on the lobbying effort, subsidy level, and domestic welfare.
Using (7), (10), and the first order condition of firm 2 in (8):
q2 = q2(q1, c2); q21 = Mq2/Mq1 = - {(pN+q2pO)(1+q3.) + FNL1q}/D1, q2c = Mq2/Mc2 = 1/D1<0,  
where, D1 = pN + (pN+q2pO)(1+q3.)<0. (11)
Using (7), (11) and the first order condition of firm 1 in (8):
q1 = q1(c1,c2), q11 =  Mq1/Mc1 =1/D2, q12 = Mq1/Mc2 = -(pN+q1pO)(1+q3.)q2c/D2, D2 = (pN +
FNL1q) + (pN+q1pO)(1+q3.)(1+q21).  (12)  
Now consider a mean-preserving spread in the domestic firms’ costs (dc1 = -dc2 < 0):
dq1 =  {1+(pN+q1pO)(1+q3.)q2c}q11dc1 > 0 if q11<0 (i.e., D2<0).  (13)
The second order condition for firm 1 requires that:7Although the diagonal dominance condition is sufficient, it is not necessary to establish
the negativity of D2 and therefore proposition-1.  For example, with linear demand, the second










2 = (2pN+q1pO)q1FO - (FN)
2 >0 Y 2pN+q1pO + FNL1q < 0.  (14)
A sufficient condition for (14) to be satisfied is (pN+FNL1q) <0.  This is ensured by diagonal
dominance, where the own effect of q1 on firm 1's marginal profit (i.e., 2pN+q1pO + FNL1q,
incorporating the effect of q1 on F) dominates the cross effect from a rise in q2 (i.e., pN+q1pO).  We
will assume that this condition holds which also ensures that D2 is negative.
7  Thus, (13) implies
that a mean-preserving spread must raise output of firm 1.  From (10), the lobbying of firm 1
rises, and, as a consequence, the subsidy rises.
Proposition-1
A mean-preserving spread of domestic marginal costs raises the level of lobbying, the export
subsidy, and domestic market share.
Proof and Comment 
The first part of the proof follows from the discussion above.  In addition, note that summing (8)
for the two domestic firms and using (7), we get:
2p(q1+q2+q3(q1+q2)) - (c1+c2) + 2F + pN(.)(q1+q2) = 0.  (8N) 
Thus, (q1+q2) must rise with F in response to a mean-preserving spread.  As firm 1's marginal cost
falls and that of firm 2 rises, firm 1's output expands.  The increase in the output of firm 1 raises
its marginal benefit from lobbying.  Consequently, lobbying and the subsidy level increase.  Firm
2's output contracts due to its cost increase.  Without endogenous subsidies, this contraction
would exactly offset the expansion of firm 1, and the mean-preserving spread would have no
effect on domestic market share.  However, due to lobbying and the associated expansion in the8
subsidy, which is also paid to firm 2, the contraction in q2 is lower.  Therefore, overall domestic
output rises.  Of course, (7) implies that the foreign output must fall, further ensuring a higher
domestic market share.  Although our contexts are quite different, our proposition supports and
complements Long and Soubeyran (1996), who find that increased cost heterogeneity tends to
raise the level of lobbying in an import competition model.  ￿
2.2 Welfare Analysis
    This sub-section explores the effect of lobbying and domestic cost heterogeneity on domestic
welfare.  Welfare is the sum of profits earned by the domestic firms from exporting, net of the
costs of the subsidy to taxpayers:
W = B
1 + B
2 - F(q1+q2) = (p-c1)q1 + (p-c2)q2 - wL1(q1). (15)
Totally differentiating and using (7) and (8):
dW = {pNq3.(q1+q2) + q2pN - F - wL1q}dq1 + {pNq3.(q1+q2) + q1pN - F}dq2 
- q1dc1 - q2dc2.  (16)
It is useful to interpret (16).  The term pNq3.(q1+q2) is the aggregate profit shifting gains (or losses)
for the domestic firms from the expansion or contraction of domestic firm i (i=1,2).  The term qipN
measures the loss to firm i when domestic firm j expands.  The costs of subsidy expansion to the
marginal unit (of q1 or q2) are measured by -F, and -wL1q measures the increased resource cost of
lobbying due to expansion of firm 1.  Finally, qidci (i=1,2) measures the efficiency effects of
changes in ci.  
Using (11) to solve for dq2, and substituting for it in (16), we obtain:
dW = [{pNq3.(q1 + q2) + q2pN- F - wL1q} + q21{pNq3.(q1 + q2) + q1pN- F}]dq1
+ {pNq3.(q1 + q2) + q1pN- F}q2cdc2 - q1dc1 - q2dc2.  (17)
In a near symmetric situation (i.e., c2 6c1, q2 6q1 = q
G), and using a mean-preserving spread (dc2 = 8Proof of the negativity of the welfare effect dW/dc2 is available from authors on request.
9To establish the second part of proposition-2 it is necessary to provide a counterexample
where W rises with cost heterogeneity.  Figure-1 provides such a numerical example (solved with
9
-dc1 > 0), it can be shown that dW/dc2 < 0, if demand is linear or strictly convex.  If demand is
strictly concave, dW/dc2 can still be shown to be negative as long as the foreign firm’s market
share is less than half.
8  Inspection of the firms’ first order conditions reveals that this must be the
case if the foreign marginal cost is not too small relative to domestic marginal costs.  For
tractability we analyze the non-symmetric case using linear demand.  Using (13) to substitute for
dq1 and using a mean-preserving spread, we obtain from (17):
dW = 2[{(L1q/pN)(wpN- FFN)/(2pN+FNL1q)} + (q1 - q2)]dc2.  (18)
Using (8):
q1 - q2 = (c1 - c2)/pN.  (19)
(18) and (19) imply that:
dW = 2[{(L1q/pN)(wpN- FFN)/(2pN+FNL1q)} + {(c1 - c2)/pN}]dc2.  (20)
We already know that in the near-symmetric case dW/dc2 must be negative (this is captured here
by the first term of (20), which is strictly negative).  Expression (20) suggests that if the cost
difference between the two domestic firms is large, then the second term may dominate the first,
and the welfare effect may be positive.
Proposition-2
For near-symmetry between the domestic firms, a mean-preserving spread must reduce welfare. 
For large cost asymmetry, the effect of the mean-preserving spread on welfare is ambiguous.
Proof and Comment
The discussion following (17) establishes the near-symmetric result.  Expression (20) and Figure-
1 at the end of the paper establishes the second part of the proposition.
9  This result is anthe help of GAMS) for the case of linear demand.  It shows that starting from a symmetric
situation a mean-preserving spread of domestic costs reduces W up to a certain critical level of
cost asymmetry.  Beyond that level W rises with increasing heterogeneity.
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interesting complement to the existing literature on the effects of cost heterogeneity on domestic
welfare.  At the beginning of section-2 we argued that in the absence of lobbying, domestic
welfare is an increasing function of domestic cost heterogeneity.  Here we find a contrasting result
which we explain below.  If the firms are near-symmetric and demand is linear, then, as c2 rises
and c1 falls, the aggregate profit- shifting gain from the expansion of firm-1 are exactly offset by
the negative effect of price reduction on firm-2 (i.e., pNq3.(q1+q2) 6 -pNqi).  Also, the efficiency
enhancement of firm 1 (i.e., q1dc1) is offset by the efficiency reduction of firm 2.  Therefore, in the
limit, (16) reduces to:
dW = -Fd(q1+q2) - wL1qdq1.   (16N)
Using proposition-1, we know that (q1+q2) as well as q1 must rise with a mean-preserving spread.  
The first term in (16N) captures the subsidy costs of domestic output expansion not justified by
any net gains in aggregate domestic profit.  The second term is the resource cost of increased
lobbying by firm 1, which can now internalize more of the gains from lobbying.  Consider at the
other extreme the case of near monopoly (domestic) where q2 tends to zero.  In this case (16)
reduces to:
dW = q1pNq3.d(q1 + q2) + q1pNdq2 - q1dc1 - Fd(q1 + q2) - wL1qdq1. (16O)
The profit-shifting gain of firm 1 from the net expansion in domestic output (first term), the gain
in profits of firm 1 as firm 2 contracts (second term), and the efficiency gains for firm 1 (third
term) all raise domestic welfare.  The negative effects on firm 2 are all scaled be a near-zero
output and disappear in (16O).  The subsidy expansion effects remain as in (16N) and are
unambiguously negative.  The final welfare effect in this extreme asymmetric case is ambiguous in10Firm-1 is assumed to be the domestic firm with the minimum cost.  Thus, the same type
of free riding equilibrium as in section-2 obtains in the present context.
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general, and depends on the relative magnitudes of these contrasting effects.  ￿
3.  Several Domestic and Foreign Firms
    Now assume that there are m foreign and n domestic firms.  Let the aggregate output of the
foreign firms be q
*, and that of the domestic firms be q.  Summing the first order conditions [see








*/dq = q*N. (21) 
Summing the first order conditions of the n domestic firms, and using (9) and (10):
n{p(.) + F(L1(q1))} - ’ci + pN(.)q = 0.  (22) 
Using (8), (9) and (10):
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p(q+q
*) - c1 +  F(L1(q1))} + q1pN = 0 Y q1 = q1(q + q
*, c1). (23)
Using (21), (22) and (23):
q = q(’ci, ’ci
*, c1).  (24)     
Case-1: A Mean-Preserving Spread in Domestic Cost with c1 Remaining Constant.
Expression (24) clearly shows that a mean-preserving spread cannot affect q (and in turn q
*)
unless a change in c1 is involved.  Therefore, from (23) we can infer that q1 cannot change.  Using
(10) we may then infer that L1 must remain constant as well.  Therefore, in contrast to
proposition-1, cost heterogeneity has no effect on the endogenous subsidy.  Domestic welfare and
the marginal welfare effects are, respectively:
W = ’(p - ci)qi - wL1(q1) Y dW = ’{(p - ci)dqi - qidci}.  (25)  
Expression (25) can be reduced to:
dW = - (2/pN)’cidci Y dW/d(Var.ci) = -(n/pN)>0, where Var.ci = ’(ci-c
G)
2/n. (26)11We suppress ’ci in the functional form for q
-(.) because we are considering a mean-
preserving spread. 
12The implications for the cases where c1 may rise or remain constant may be similarly
derived.
12
Thus, a mean-preserving spread cannot reduce W. 
Case-2: A Mean-Preserving Spread in Domestic Cost with c1 Involved in the Spread. 
Let q
- be the aggregate domestic output excluding the dominant firm.  From (21) and (22) we can
see that q





-)) - ’ci + nF(L1(q1)) + (q1 + q





-N = - {pN + nFNL1q + (1+q
*N)(npN+qpO)}/{pN+ (1+q
*N)(npN+qpO)}. (27b) 
Using the function q




-(q1))] - c1 + F(L1(q1)) + q1pN[.] = 0. (28a)
Using the implicit function theorem on this expression we obtain (28b).
Mq1/Mc1(mean-preserving) = 1/{pN + FNL1q + (pN+q1pO)(1+q
-N)(1+q
*N)}<0. (28b)
Since c1 is the minimum among the marginal costs of the domestic firms, in the two domestic firm
case this necessarily implies that a mean-preserving spread must reduce c1.  In the multi-firm case,
we will still assume that a mean-preserving spread (including c1) involves a reduction in c1.
12 
Thus, (28b) shows that q1 must rise and from (10) we infer that lobbying and the endogenous
subsidy rises as well.  Using (21) and (22) it is easy to see that the rise in the subsidy must raise q,
and reduce q
*.  Thus, proposition-1 extends to the present context.  Using the first equality in (25)
above and simplifying:
dW = -Fdq + qdp - 2’qidci + qdF + d(q+q
*)’qi(pN+qipO) - wdL1. (29) 
Consider an initial situation of near-symmetry where qi 6q
G (for all i).  Expression (29) reduces to:13
dW/dF = -Fµ + q
G[pNµ{n(1+q
*N) - 1} - 1]; (30)    
where, µ= dq/dF = (-n)/{pN + (1+q
*N)(npN+qpO)}>0.  Since we have already established that F
rises with a mean-preserving spread, a sufficient condition for welfare reduction is: 
{n(1+q
*N) - 1} $ 0.  This condition is equivalent to:
n $ (m + 1) + "
*R, where R = QPO/PN, and "
* = q
*/Q = foreign market share. (31)
Proposition-3
If the mean-preserving spread does not change the cost of the dominant firm, domestic lobbying,
subsidy, and market share are not affected by it, and welfare must rise.  If the spread reduces the
cost of the dominant firm, domestic lobbying, subsidy, and domestic market share rise.  Welfare
falls starting from a near-symmetric situation for a sufficiently large number of domestic firms. 
Welfare may rise if the initial asymmetry is high.
Proof and Comment
The proof is in the discussion under cases 1 and 2 above.  Recall that in case-1, the mean-
preserving spread does not involve the dominant domestic firm (firm 1).  Here our results are
similar to Bergstrom-Varian (1985) and Long-Soubeyran (1997) in spite of the presence of
lobbying.  A mean-preserving spread does not affect aggregate output [recall (21) and (24)] and
therefore does not affect the marginal benefit (for a given q1) of the dominant firm.  With an
unchanged marginal cost, marginal profit of the dominant firm is unaffected at the initial
equilibrium.  Hence, firm 1's output does not change, implying that lobbying effort and the subsidy
are unchanged.  These in turn lead to an unchanged domestic market share and higher domestic
welfare (as in Long-Soubeyran, 1997).  On the other hand, this case contrasts with our
proposition-1 and our case-2, as well as Long and Soubeyran (1996), where greater heterogeneity
leads to a rise in the lobbying effort. 14
    In case-2, the fall in the marginal cost of firm-1 will tend to raise its output and thus lobbying
and the subsidy.  This subsidy expansion encourages the other domestic firms to increase output. 
Thus, aggregate output rises, in contrast to Bergstrom-Varian (1985) or Long-Soubeyran (1997). 
Indeed, for near-symmetry between the domestic firms, a mean-preserving spread must reduce
welfare if the number of domestic firms is sufficiently large.  This is interesting because it
contrasts with the welfare effect that one would expect because of better allocative efficiency. 
For near-symmetry, allocative efficiency effects are small, and what matters are the profit shifting
effects and the lobbying-expansion costs.  The larger the number of domestic firms the greater is
the negative terms-of-trade effects of each domestic firm’s expansion on the others.  In contrast, a
large number of foreign firms accentuates the profit shifting gains from domestic expansion, and
raises the possibility of a welfare gain.  Therefore, a sufficiently high number of domestic firms
ensures a welfare reduction.  
Finally, notice that the term ’qidci approaches zero at a near-symmetric situation (because
’qidci 6q
G ’dci = 0).  However, this term can be significantly negative (because the cost
reductions will be weighted by high output levels) if we start from a very asymmetric situation. 
This will help in making the welfare effect in (29) positive.  Thus, proposition-2 is modified but
generally supported in the multi-firm case.   ￿
4.  Conclusion
    This paper considers the effects of cost heterogeneity on export market rivalry, lobbying and
welfare.  The findings complement the previous contributions by showing that the market share
and welfare effects of cost heterogeneity can be remarkably different under lobbying.  Also, the
initial degree of cost asymmetry is shown to be critical in driving the welfare results.  15
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